Narrative Echolocation and Superimposition of Mental States

Whales practice echo-location: they send signals in the environment and from the coming back response they figure out what the surrounding look alike. Now take human brains; they send out semantic radiations and when they encounter concepts (conceptual interpretation of the surrounding environment), they receive the re-entry for an interpreter. Every concept is a reminder of an underlying interpreter.

Indeed concepts are “fossils” of a mind’s previous passage. When a mind moves in his habitat, she left traces of her explorative extension in that environment. Therefore a following human brain tracking down that cognitive walking receive the semantic re-entry of a consciousness. Subsequent explorations shape and design concepts interwoven in a such a way they form infrastructures a brain can walk through. The viable conceptual architecture is a narrative world and a human brain navigating in that cognitive track is accelerated in a mind.

This is the technology used by human brains to walk in their own complexity, through the projection of multidimensional layers of cognitive exploration. Therefore what we call mind is a cognitive performance in the form of narrativity; the phenomenon is quite unique because the subject experiences a very centered cognitive feedback: consciousness.

This experience is so vivid, the brain is completely immersed in the circumstances of that projection. Given the fact we express ourselves in that representation and therefore we coined concepts within that cognitive environment, that experience is the definition of real and fiction. The practice of walking in that experience establish our conceptual ground: it makes no sense then to call it true or false. Nonetheless the brain experience of being there as a mind, is representational; and to the extent that representation is narrative, the self-recognition of the brain as a mind, is fictional (which doesn’t entail it is false).

Human minds are extremely active in the narrative vicissitudes they’ve been presented to, because they emerge from playing those events. In fact the technology of mind is the practice of handing down from brain to brain the experience of being a consciousness. The interwoven narrative infrastructures present many different sub-goals and narrative lines for the mind inhabiting those semiotic environment; a human consciousness is also able to walk on the very projection of her representation: namely she can be aware of being a representation. In this case she flows along the limit of her representativity; that border is the limit of being there and its crossing produces the meaningfulness to fade. But properly there is no other side to the limit of being there (of meaningfulness).

Some cultural traditions more than others are interested in inhabiting more closely to the limit. One consequence, apparently, is the superimposition of mental states on the single brain representation: in those particular accelerations, the vicissitudes of the brain are trained to play consistently with projecting more than one consciousness. The risk of exploring conflicting characters, producing cognitive friction, is overcome with the “emanation” strategy: the same consciousness emanates from brain to brain. So instead of the mere mind technology, what is handed down from brain to brain is an already centered consciousness. In this way a broader mind horizon can be passed, while the focus of a single consciousness dissipates the cognitive friction (and the relative schizoid symptoms).

The community handing down already centered consciousness is per definition searching old companions under new forms. The contingency of an individual psychology is no better placed in a new creation than in the transmission of an old one: for a brain learning to impersonate a new mind or rehearsing old ones is not a big difference of performance.

Under this respect, the Western echolocation of an interpreter experience a narrative empowerment: not only the semiotic environment is talking to a consciousness, but the semiotic feedbacks are personal. The multiple layers of meaning in the environment is telling me my own story, the story concerning very much my own experience. Of course “mine”, “myself” should be reviewed: the contingent embodiment will be definitely much more respective for the ancestors and for the future generation. Not such a foolish idea as we thought at the beginning!

At the end of the day it’s a sub-category of the extended mind theory, in the temporal dimension. And time is the elapsing of movement under mind breath (a kind of Aristotelian definition).